Pictured: Foreign Minister Lászlo Bárdossy (first from right) walks in front of a guard of honor. Visible: Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin Döme Sztójay (first from left) and SS Obergruppenführer Baron von Eberstein (second from left). Dated 1941.

Quoting Deborah S. Cornelius’s Hungary in World War II: Caught in the Cauldron, pages 148–152:

Confirming the doubts of Rundstedt, the progress of Army Group South was slower than that of the other two army groups; the Seventeenth Army pushed forward only ten to twelve kilometers on the first day. On June 25, 1941, the chief of staff of Army South repeated his request for the intervention of troops from [the Kingdom of] Hungary. He pointed out that this would be a significant unburdening of the Seventeenth Army’s south wing and help the attack of the Eleventh Army.

The answer came from the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), [the Third Reich’s] High Command of the Army—“the question of Hungarian participation is still open.”⁶ Halder noted in his diary of June 25: “Hungary’s collaboration would be desirable. Hungary, however, wants to be asked officially. The Führer will not do that, for political reasons.”⁷

All this changed on June 26 at a few minutes after one o’clock in the afternoon when three unidentified planes dropped bombs on the Hungarian city of Kassa. The bombs struck the post and telegraph office, a settlement and several homes, leaving several dead and a larger number wounded. One bomb failed to explode and was found to be of Russian manufacture. The planes then disappeared toward the southeast, the direction from which they had come.

The local military authorities concluded that Soviet planes were responsible, but to this day the question of responsibility has not been solved. Many Hungarians believed that the [Third Reich] had used the bombing as a trick to bring [the Kingdom of] Hungary into the war, but absolutely no German documents have turned up to support this thesis. The Russians denied responsibility.⁸

When the news reached Budapest, the minister of defense, Károly Bartha, and Chief of the General Staff Henrik Werth rushed to tell the regent what had happened. Horthy’s immediate reaction was indignation—the country had been attacked! His sense of honor required that he act.

On the spot he ordered that appropriate retaliatory measures be initiated, but it is not clear if he was thinking of a declaration of war or only reprisals. Horthy, who was [supposedly] apolitical, was always prone to making quick impulsive decisions, which he could be talked out of later by calmer minds. His respected advisors, Moricz Esterházy or István Bethlen, had been able to talk the regent out of hasty actions in other situations, but both Bartha and Werth were eager for war.⁹

By the time Bárdossy heard of the incident and reached the regent, Horthy had already given the order for retaliatory measures. A career diplomat, Bárdossy had never had close relations with Horthy, and he did not attempt to counter the impulsive decision. He believed that Horthy wanted immediate action—and that this action would be war. He explained that he must first go to the Council of Ministers since only they could make a declaration of a state of war.

Horthy seems to have believed that after council deliberation Bárdossy would return to him with the decision for his approval, but Bárdossy believed he had been ordered to put a decision on war into effect. Therefore there was no need to consult the regent further. Later Horthy charged that Bárdossy had presented him with a fait accompli.¹⁰

One hour and twenty minutes after bombs fell on Kassa, Bárdossy summoned an emergency session of the Council of Ministers, which met so hurriedly that several members were missing. Dezso Laky, minister of public supply, arrived only at the end, and Ferenc Zsindely, secretary of state, was absent, while Antal Ullein‐Reviczky, head of the foreign ministry’s press division, was attending a lunch party and sent a deputy in his stead.

In that short time Bárdossy had made up his mind to a complete reversal of his whole policy. At the council meeting he announced that the Soviets had bombed Kassa, and in his view Hungary should declare that as a consequence she regarded herself as in a state of war.

Opinions were divided. Minister of Defense Bartha condemned the Soviet attack as an uncalled‐for provocation and made vigorous pleas to carry out reprisals. The moderate minister of the interior, Ferenc Keresztes‐Fischer, thought it was too early to declare a state of war, reasoning that the bombing was not that serious an action. He believed the army was not strong enough, and that it was against the country’s interests to start a war against a great power.

Bálint Hóman, the pro‐[Reich] minister of culture, and Reményi‐Schneller, minister of finance, both supported the prime minister, claiming that [the Kingdom of] Hungary should not be the only one left out of the action. [The Kingdoms of] Italy and Romania had joined in the war the day of the [Wehrmacht’s] attack and Slovakia had also joined.¹¹

Bárdossy summed up the opinion of the council, that all were in favor of reprisals, and all, except Keresztes‐Fischer, were in favor of stating that Hungary regarded herself as being in a state of war with Russia, but participation in military action should be as limited as possible. Evidently no vote was taken. The ministers did not seem to have realized that Bárdossy’s summing‐up was equivalent to agreement to a binding resolution.

According to the official record of the meeting signed by Bárdossy, the ministers’ decision to declare the existence of a state of war between [the Kingdom of] Hungary and the USSR was unanimous, although at Bárdossy’s trial in 1945, it was charged that he had falsified the evidence—that four ministers had voted against the decision.¹²

Without consulting the regent, Bárdossy immediately drafted and issued a communiqué describing the attack on Kassa as an act of unprovoked aggression by the USSR and ended by stating that in consequence “Hungary considered herself from this moment on as at war with the U.S.S.R.”

Later, on the advice of Ullein‐Reviczky, he modified the wording to state: “In consequence of the repeated attacks made by Soviet aircraft, contrary to international law, against Hungarian territory, Hungary considers a state of war to have come into being between herself and the USSR.”¹³ That day he did not inform the regent of his communiqué.

The question remains why Bárdossy made the fatal step so precipitously. The Kassa incident was no casus belli; Molotov strongly denied Moscow’s involvement.¹⁴ There was no overt German pressure. Bárdossy said the step was inevitable but in later years historians have blamed him directly for [the Kingdom of] Hungary’s entry into war. Since the fall of State Socialism in 1989, many World War II officers and political figures charged with war crimes have been rehabilitated, but there is still no discussion of clearing Bárdossy’s name.

Bárdossy had been appointed prime minister hastily, immediately following Teleki’s suicide. Although acknowledged to be brilliant, he was often impatient. He could be charming and had been an excellent representative for [the Kingdom of] Hungary in England, and successful in Bucharest in improving Hungarian–Romanian relations, but he was a novice in domestic politics, not familiar with parliamentary rules and conduct.

A proud and sensitive man, he was prone to make quick decisions and to make them on his own. Not patient with those around him who were less bright, he was not good at consulting others nor taking advice. To add to his impatience he had serious stomach problems. It seems that at this point he had come to the decisions on what he believed to be the correct course.¹⁵

The next day, June 27, Bárdossy appeared before Parliament. The standing chairman, Jeno Szinyei Merse, announced with outrage that there had been an air attack by the Soviet Air Force the day before, but there was no mention that the identity of the attackers could be questioned. He then introduced Prime Minister Bárdossy to acclamation by the House (“Hear! Hear!”). Bárdossy repeated the news of the Soviet attack. “Thus the Hungarian Royal Government decided that as a result of the attack a state of war exists between Hungary and the Soviet Union.”¹⁶

The parliamentary record states that his news was greeted by long and lively cheering and clapping from all sides. From the extreme Right came the shouts: “Out with the Social Democrats.” Bárdossy continued, stating that the Hungarian army would take the necessary measures. There was no further parliamentary discussion, the house continued with a long drawn‐out debate on the need to further restrict the activities of the Jews.¹⁷

According to a later report there were at most forty representatives present. The one or two Smallholders and Social Democrat representatives immediately left the chamber and the loud clapping came from the ten to fifteen Arrow Cross representatives. The leader of one opposition party, Rassay, asked as he left the chamber, “Are you happy about this?” The government party representatives were surprised and clapped politely.¹⁸

Bárdossy did not even appear in the upper house which received the same notification read out by the president. His failure to consult the upper house, which was taken as an insult, greatly reduced his esteem in that body.

The declaration of war was not unpopular—none of those in the opposition, neither the liberal parties nor the Social Democrats challenged the declaration. The prominent opposition leader, Bajcsy Zsilinsky, even sent a message to Bárdossy praising him for defending the country’s interests, and the military were especially jubilant.

Hungarians had been permeated with anti‐Bolshevism ever since the catastrophic Soviet Republic of 1919, and the officers, indoctrinated with an anti‐Bolshevik attitude, were infatuated with Germany and its technical advances and rapid victories. A number of the younger officers saw in Hitler’s social reforms a new society. Three military commissions, which had gone to [the Third Reich] in 1940–41, were unanimous in their opinion that no power on the continent could defeat the Wehrmacht.

In light of [Fascism’s] rapid victories everyone thought that it would be a short war. There was no thought that [the Kingdom of] Hungary’s participation might entangle the country in hostilities with the West.

But the simple peasant or worker felt no enthusiasm at the prospect of fighting [Soviets], who meant nothing to him. Closer association with [the Third Reich] was still unpopular among many Hungarians. The regent preserved a curious reticence about the war. It was many days before any Hungarian paper suggested that Horthy had ordered the campaign and he signed no order to the troops. In a speech given on June 29 to unveil a monument to the World War I fallen, he did not include a single reference to the new war.

(Emphasis added.)